Getting sensitive (Part II): EU’s failure in handling the Kosovo case

“We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law.”

This is the beginning of the declaration of independence adopted by 109 deputies from the Kosovo National Assembly on February 17th, 2008, the day that marks the climax of Kosovo’s fight for independence from Serbia, marked by violence and discriminationfrom both sides throughout history and rounds of failed internationally-moderated negotiations in the recent past. The new self-declared republic was recognized officially by 56 UN members, including the US and most of the EU states, other states preffered to wait and see, while a minority of EU members and vocal Russia refused to recognize the new republic.

After the waves created over a year ago by the unilateral move of the Kosovar authorities, the situation is now in stalemate. The fact that the answer to the question “Is Kosovo an independent state and a soveraign republic?” still depends on who you’re asking shows that the international treaties and legal regulations we call “international law” failed to provide the answers to the ambiguous context created by the new situation in Kosovo.

Coming closer to our EU-related interests, I think I can safely say that the only post-independence policy of the EU regarding Kosovo has been “Agree to disagree”. While prior to the declaration of independence the EU led series of talks between Kosovo and Serbia the Ahtisaari plan was put forward as a solution, after the declaration the EU, through its institutions, preffered to remain silent. The situation is very much resemblant to the one generated by the Iraq war in 2003. But then disagreeing was an option, because every state had the power to support or not the US-led intervention and the EU as a whole could stay out of it. In the case of Kosovo, however, things are a bit more complicated. Each EU state took an own decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo or not. But considering the natural interest of the EU towards the Western Balkans and the fact that the EU has an official nieghborhood policy should oblige the Union to deal with Kosovo in a coherent way.

22 EU member states recognized Kosovo’s independence without too much hesitation. Only 5 chose to consider Kosovo is still a Serbian province: Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus. Each of them deals with minority issues or breakaway provinces on its own territory and considered that it would be a matter of political consistency and fairness towards Serbia not to recognize the new republic. Personally, I agree with this position. Not because Romania decided not to recognize Kosovo, but because international recognition of a unilateral act when international laws are unable to provide a “correct” answer is dangerous and contradicts exactly the reason why international laws have been created - to find unanimously accepted solutions for situations when negotiations fail.

The ambiguity surrounding Kosovo raises significant problems for the EU and its future policies. Although there is no precise timeline for a potential enlargement towards the Western Balkans, negotiations are being carried already with states in the region. Serbia openly stated it wishes to join the EU and Kosovo itself might apply for membership.

Therefore, reaching an internal agreement on Kosovo and a common position of the EU is essential. If it chooses not to recognize Kosovo because 5 of its member states do not wish to do so and unanimity cannot be reached, then the EU cannot hold any kind of official discussion with Kosovo and it might negotiate with Serbia taking into account Kosovo as part of it. If it chooses to recognize Kosovo’s independence, then the EU’s official negotiations with Serbia or Kosovo might not be taken into consideration by the opposing member states.

The Kosovo case has shown once again that the EU is still uncapable of dealing with internal disagreement and of speaking with one voice in the international sphere. This is a major flaw of the European institutional framework an, unless it is addressed as soon as possible, it might produce even more problems once the number of member states increases. Moreover, it is a sign of weakness and the EU cannot be taken into accound as a credible actor in international relations, thus undermining its already thin implication in efforts to mediate conflicts around the world.

More on Kosovo can be read in Ari Rusila’s excellent posts.

Latest posts by George Iulian JIGLAU

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One Response to “Getting sensitive (Part II): EU’s failure in handling the Kosovo case”

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